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Risk-Averse Equilibrium Analysis and Computation
Ilia Shilov, He´le`ne Le Cadre, and Ana Busic
Abstract— We consider two market designs for a network
of prosumers, trading energy: (i) a centralized design which
acts as a benchmark, and (ii) a peer-to-peer market design.
High renewable energy penetration requires that the energy
market design properly handles uncertainty. To that purpose,
we consider risk neutral models for market designs (i), (ii),
and their risk-averse interpretations in which prosumers are
endowed with coherent risk measures reflecting heterogeneity
in their risk attitudes. We characterize analytically risk-neutral
and risk-averse equilibrium in terms of existence and unique-
ness, relying on Generalized Nash Equilibrium and Variational
Equilibrium as solution concepts. To hedge their risk towards
uncertainty and complete the market, prosumers can trade
financial contracts. We provide closed form characterisations of
the risk-adjusted probabilities under different market regimes
and a distributed algorithm for risk trading mechanism relying
on the Generalized potential game structure of the problem.
The impact of risk heterogeneity and financial contracts on the
prosumers’ expected costs are analysed numerically in a three
node network and the IEEE 14-bus network.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing amount of Distributed Energy Resources
(DERs), which have recently been integrated in power
systems, and the more proactive role of consumers have
transformed the classical centralized power system opera-
tion by introducing more uncertainty and decentralization
in the decisions. Following this trend, electricity markets
are starting to restructure, from a centralized market design
in which all the operations were managed by a central
market operator, to more decentralized designs involving
local energy communities which can trade energy by the
intermediate of the central market operator or in a peer-to-
peer (p2p) setting [11–13, 21, 22]. P2p energy trading is a
novel paradigm, where prosumers providing their own energy
from DERs such as solar panels, wind turbines, combined
heat and power (CHP), gas boilers, storage technologies,
demand response mechanisms [3], etc., exchange energy with
one another. The development of p2p energy trading has
significant potential that can benefit end users, both in terms
of revenue generation and in terms of reducing the cost of
electricity, as well as reducing grid dependence [21].
A. Related work
Consideration of a novel market organization allowing
p2p energy trading requires a careful quantitative compar-
ison with the existing centralized design which is currently
implemented in most of the existing pool-based markets.
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The economic dispatch of a local energy community under
different structures of communications is analysed using
consensus based approaches in [12, 13]. Game theoretic
approaches integrating the prosumers’ strategic behaviors are
considered in [21, 22] through auctions and to quantify the
efficiency loss in [11]. To analyse the market in presence of
shared coupling constraints, we employ Generalized Nash
Equilibrium (GNE) as solution concept [8, 10, 23], and a
refinement of it, called Variational Equilibria (VE), assuming
the shadow variables associated with the shared coupling
constraints are aligned among the agents [10, 19].
Inclusion of different risk perceptions of the agents in
the energy trading model calls for risk-augmented market
formulations in which agents are endowed with risk mea-
sures in their utility functions. Large literature exists on
the impact of risk on agent decisions in electricity markets
[1,7,9,13,14,16,17]. Additionally, heterogeneous description
of uncertainties on agent assets make the market incomplete
[13]. In order to hedge their risk towards uncertainties
and complete the market, electricity market participants can
choose among several financial products and derivatives as
reviewed in [14].
We consider risk-adjusted market with heterogeneous risk
attitudes of the agents, who are willing to maximize their
risk-adjusted utility. As argued in Philpott et al. in [16],
if agents have different views on future outcomes, then
the social welfare optimization might not correspond to the
competitive equilibrium solution. This raises the question on
how one might complete the market with suitable financial
instruments to enable a welfare maximizing competitive
equilibrium. We include financial contracts as instruments
to reduce the effect of heterogeneous risk attitudes on the
outcome of the risk adjusted market and analyse the regimes
of the market with respect to the exogenous and endogenous
contracts’ prices.
B. Contributions
Heterogeneous risk-adjusted market is comprehensively
considered in [13]. Moret et al. address the definition of fair-
ness and the impact of risk in a one settlement two-stage p2p
market. They provide a model of risk hedging mechanism
via financial contracts and analyse their impact on fairness
and agents’ payments. In this paper, we extend the given
contract mechanism, providing a distributed implementation
of the mechanism. Furthermore, relying on game-theoretic
solution concepts such as GNE, VE, we characterise the p2p
market outcomes, deriving non trivial results on existence
and uniqueness of market equilibrium.
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The difference between centralized and p2p markets is
extensively addressed in [11], where authors capture the
imperfections in information of the agents’ caused by p2p
organization by employing GNE and VE. In this paper, we
extend the quantification of efficiency loss considering a risk-
adjusted p2p market.
In [7], Gerard et al. employ coherent risk measures. They
analyse risk-adjusted markets and evaluate the impact of risk-
hedging contracts on the market efficiency. They address
the question of uniqueness of risk-averse equilibria and
give insight on some equivalences between social planner
problems and equilibrium problems. Using the same risk-
averse setting, we extend their model by considering the
strategic behaviors of the prosumers. Furthermore, we pro-
vide a new direction for the distributed implementation of
financial contracts and risk-averse equilibrium computation,
allowed by the Generalized Potential Game structure of our
problem.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follow: in
Sections II and III, we introduce our model. In Section IV,
we analyse two market designs: risk-neutral in Subsection
IV-A, where we study the difference between nodal prices
in centralized and p2p risk neutral cases, and risk-adjusted in
Subsection IV-B in which we compute the agents’ strategies
in a risk-adjusted electricity market. In Section V we analyse
equilibria in an incomplete market and provide results on
the coincidence of the centralized design outcome and VE
assuming constant congestion costs. We prove uniqueness of
VE in the risk-neutral setting under the general assumption of
linearity of congestion costs. In Section VI, we quantify the
impact of inclusion of financial risk-hedging contracts on the
market outcome and derive closed form expressions linking
the risk trading market outcome to exogenous insurance price
level. Two test cases are presented in Section VII: a three
node toy network and the standard IEEE 14-bus network. We
evaluate numerically the impact of prosumers’ heterogeneous
risk attitudes and the impact of risk-hedging contracts.
C. Notations
Bold symbol x denotes a vector and capital italic symbol
X denotes a set. Exclusion of a set is denoted by X \A :=
{x|x ∈ X , x /∈ A}. Ω represents a finite set of scenarios,
and X(ω) denotes the realization of the random variable X
according to the scenario ω ∈ Ω. E denotes the expectation
with respect to the discrete distribution (pω)ω∈Ω, R refers to
a risk measure.
II. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
We consider a single-settlement market for p2p energy
trading made of a set N of N prosumers – each one of them
being located in a node of the distribution grid. In a single-
settlement market, each prosumer n chooses independently
her bilateral trades qn, at a cost C˜(qn), energy generation
Gn, incurring an uncertain production cost C(Gn) and
demand Dn, to maximize her utility function Πn.
We assume that there are a finite number of scenarios
ω ∈ Ω. The bilateral trades negotiated within prosumers,
the flexibility activated by the prosumers and the demand
all depend on the scenario ω defining the realized target
demand D∗n(ω) and RES-based generations ∆Gn(ω) at each
node n.
III. AGENTS
A. Prosumers
Let Γn be the set of neighbors of n, with the structure
of a communication network (local energy community). It
does not necessarily reflect the grid constraints. As usual,
we assume that n ∈ Γn, for all n ∈ N . In particular, Γ0 :=
N \ {0}.
In each node, we introduce Dn := {Dn ∈ R+|Dn ≤
Dn ≤ Dn} as agent n’s demand set, with Dn and Dn being
the lower and upper-bounds on demand capacity. ∆Gn as
the random RES-based generation at node n.
In parallel to the demand and RES-based generation-sides,
we define the self-generation-side by letting Gn := {Gn ∈
R+|Gn ≤ Gn ≤ Gn} be agent ns generation set, where
Gn and Gn are the lower and upper-bounds on generation
capacity.
The decision variables of each prosumer n are her demand
Dn, energy generation Gn, and the quantity exchanged
between n and m in the direction from m to n, qmn, for
all m ∈ Γn \ {n}. If qmn ≥ 0, then n buys qmn from m,
otherwise (qmn < 0) n sells −qmn to m. We impose an
inequality on the trading reciprocity:
qmn + qnm ≤ 0, ∀m ∈ Γn, (1)
which means that, in the case where qmn > 0, the quantity
that n buys from m can not be larger than the quantity qnm
that m is willing to offer to n. Let κnm ∈ [0,+∞) be the
equivalent interconnection capacity between node n and node
m, such that κnm = κmn and Gn ≤ κnm and
qnm ≤ κnm, ∀m ∈ Γn (2)
1) Local Supply and Demand Balancing: Local supply
and demand equilibrium leads to the following equality in
each node n in N :
Dn(ω) = Gn(ω) + ∆Gn(ω) +
∑
m∈Γn
qmn(ω),
= Gn(ω) + ∆Gn(ω) +Qn(ω),∀ω ∈ Ω. (3)
2) Cost and Usage Benefit Functions: Flexibility activa-
tion (production) cost in node n is modeled as a quadratic
function of local activated flexibility, using three positive
parameters an, bn and dn:
Cn
(
Gn(ω)
)
=
1
2
anGn(ω)
2 + bnGn(ω) + dn,∀ω ∈ Ω. (4)
We make the standard assumption that self-generation
occurs at zero marginal cost.
The usage benefit perceived by agent n is modeled as
a strictly concave function of node n demand, using two
positive parameters a˜n, b˜n and a target demand D∗n(ω),
defined exogenously for agent n:
Un
(
Dn(ω)
)
= −a˜n(Dn(ω)−D∗n(ω))2 + b˜n,∀ω ∈ Ω. (5)
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We consider that prosumers have preferences on the possible
trades with their neighbors. The preferences are modeled
with (product) differentiation prices: each agent n has a price
cnm(q) modeled as a function of trading desicions of agents
on the edge (n,m) to buy energy from an agent m in her
neighborhood Γn. The total trading cost function of agent n
is denoted by:
C˜n(qn) =
∑
m∈Γn,m 6=n
cnm(q)qmn, (6)
where cnm(q) = amn(qmn + qnm) + bmn, bmn > 0, amn =
anm ∈ R – edge-specific cost described as a function of the
trading decisions on the edge (n,m). Coefficient amn may
be interpreted as a physical property of the link (n,m) equal
for both agents m and n, for example how the traded flows
affect the congestion on the edge, and term bmn captures
agent-specific preferences.
Example 1: Consider the case where amn = 0, that is –
cnm(q) = bmn > 0 is a constant, which provides interesting
economics interpretations. Parameters bmn can model taxes
to encourage/refrain the development of certain technologies
(micro-CHPs, storage, solar panels) in some nodes. They
can also capture agents’ preferences to pay regarding certain
characteristics of trades (RES-based generation, location of
the prosumer, transport distance, size of the prosumer, etc.).
If qmn > 0 (i.e., n buys qmn from m) then n has to pay
the cost bmnqmn > 0. Thus, the higher bmn is, the less
interesting it is for n to buy energy from m but the more
interesting it is for n to sell energy to m.
3) Prosumer n’s cost function: We introduce the revenue
generated by the selling of the aggregated surplus to the
grid operator as p0(ω)
∑
n∈N Qn, where p0(ω) is the price
of the import as defined on the balancing (real-time market)
and Qn(ω) :=
∑
m∈Γn qmn(ω) is defined as the difference
between the sum of imports and the sum of exports in
node n. Qn will be called the net import at node n. It
is proved in [11] that at the equilibrium, the total sum of
the net imports at all nodes should be negative or null, i.e.,∑
n∈N Qn ≤ 0. Prosumer n’s cost function is defined as
the difference between the usage benefit resulting from the
consumption of Dn energy unit and the sum of the flexibility
activation, trading costs and p0Qn, which represents an
allocation of the profit resulting from the surplus selling on
the balancing to prosumer n by the aggregator proportionally
to the prosumer’s contribution to the surplus. Formally, it
takes the form:
Πn(ω) = Cn
(
Gn(ω)
)
+ C˜n
(
qn(ω)
)
+
+ p0(ω)Qn(ω)− Un
(
Dn(ω)
)
,∀ω ∈ Ω, (7)
where qn(ω) =
(
qmn(ω)
)
m∈Γn,m 6=n.
B. Local Market Operator (MO)
We introduce the social cost as the sum of the cost
functions of all the agents in N :
SC(ω) =
∑
n∈N
Πn(ω). (8)
IV. TWO MARKET DESIGNS
In the following sections, we assume existence of solutions
of the considered optimization problems to be given. We con-
sider notions of Generalized Nash Equilibria and Variational
Equilibria: both of them exist under mild conditions [10],
[23].
We introduce a risk measure R, that is a functional
that associates to a random utility function its deterministic
equivalent, i.e., the deterministic utility deemed as equivalent
to the random loss. We assume a coherent risk measure [2],
meaning that it satisfies four natural properies: monotonicity
(if X ≥ Y then R[X] ≥ R[Y ]), concavity (R is concave),
translation-equivarience (R[X + c] = R[X] + c with c ∈ R)
and positive homogeneity (R[λX] = λR[X], with λ ≥ 0).
A. Risk neutral formulation
1) Centralized case: First, we consider centralized case,
where global Market Operator minimizes social cost for risk-
neutral community. We denote feasibility sets as
Kn(x−n) := {xn = (Dn, Gn, qn)|Dn ∈ Dn, Gn ∈ Gn,
(1), (2), (3) hold ∀ω ∈ Ω}, (9)
where x−n denotes a vector of decisions of all agents exclud-
ing agent n, and joint admissible set as a K := ∏nKn(x−n).
Then, formulation is as follows:
min
D,G,q
∑
ω∈Ω
pω
∑
n∈N
Πn(ω),
s.t. (D,G, q) ∈ K.
The objective function is convex as the sum of convex
functions defined on a convex feasibility set. Indeed, the
feasibility set is obtained as Cartesian product of convex sets.
We can compute the Lagrangian function associated with
the standard constrained optimization problem of social cost
minimization under constraints and derive KKT conditions
associated with it to determine the solution of the centralized
market design optimization problem. We denote νωn , ν
ω
n dual
variables associated with constraint Gn ≤ Gn(ω) ≤ Gn
respectively, µω
n
, µωn dual variables associated with constraint
Dn ≤ Dn(ω) ≤ Dn. Let ξωn denote dual variable associated
with constraint (2), ζωn denote dual variable for (1) and λ
ω
n
for (3).
Taking the derivative of the Lagrangian function with
respect to Dn(ω), Gn(ω), qmn(ω), for all n ∈ N and all
m ∈ Γn,m 6= n, the stationarity conditions write down as
follows.
Computations of the first order stationarity conditions give:
∂L
∂Dn(ω)
= 0⇔ 2pωa˜n
(
Dn(ω)−D∗n(ω)
)
− µω
n
+ µωn + λ
ω
n = 0,∀ω ∈ Ω, (10)
∂L
∂Gn(ω)
= 0⇔ pω
(
anGn(ω) + bn
)
− νωn + νωn − λωn = 0,∀ω ∈ Ω, (11)
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∂L
∂qmn(ω)
= 0⇔ pω
(
2amn(qmn + qnm) + bmn
)
+ pωp0(ω) + ξ
ω
nm + ζ
ω
nm − λωn = 0,∀ω ∈ Ω. (12)
Complementarity slackness conditions take the following
form:
0 ≤ µω
n
⊥ Dn(ω)−Dn ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N , (13a)
0 ≤ µωn ⊥ Dn −Dn(ω) ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N , (13b)
0 ≤ νωn ⊥ Gn(ω)−Gn ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N , (13c)
0 ≤ νωn ⊥ Gn −Gn(ω) ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N , (13d)
0 ≤ ξωnm ⊥ κmn − qmn ≥ 0,∀m ∈ Γn,m 6= n, ∀n ∈ N ,
(13e)
0 ≤ ζωnm ⊥ − qmn − qnm ≥ 0,∀m ∈ Γn,m > n, ∀n ∈ N .
(13f)
From the last equation we infer that the nodal price at n
can be expressed analytically as the trading decisions qmn
and qnm, the congestion constraint dual variable, the price
of the import and the bilateral trade prices for all ω ∈ Ω:
λωn = pω(2amn(qmn + qnm) + bmn + p0(ω)) + ξ
ω
nm + ζ
ω
nm.
(14)
From equation (12), we infer, for any couple of nodes
n ∈ N ,m ∈ Γn,m > n, that ∀ω ∈ Ω:
ζωmn = λ
ω
m − ξωmn − pω(2amn(qnm + qmn) + bnm + p0(ω)),
ζωnm = λ
ω
n − ξωnm − pω(2amn(qmn + qnm) + bmn + p0(ω)).
Subtracting those two last members in the equation above,
we infer that ∀m ∈ Γn,m 6= n, ∀n ∈ N ,∀ω ∈ Ω:
λωn − λωm = ξωnm − ξωmn + pω(bmn − bnm). (15)
Then, can we have a closed form expression for the nodal
price as a function of λω0 only. Indeed node 0 is assumed
to belong to any neighborhood. We obtain the following
expression for the nodal price at node n:
λωn = λ
ω
0 +ξ
ω
n0−ξω0n+pω(b0n−bn0),∀n ∈ N ,∀ω ∈ Ω. (16)
From first two equation of KKT conditions, we infer that,
at the optimum, for each node n:
Dn(ω) = D
∗
n(ω)−
1
2pωa˜n
(λωn + (µ
ω
n − µωn)), (17)
Gn(ω) = − bn
an
+
1
pωan
(λωn − (νωn − νωn)). (18)
From these expressions and (3) we infer that the net import
at node n can be expressed as a linear function of the nodal
price:
Qn(ω) = D
∗
n−
1
2pωa˜n
(µωn−µωn) +
bn
an
+
1
pωan
(νωn−νωn)
− ( 1
2pωa˜n
+
1
pωan
)λωn −∆Gn(ω). (19)
The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: At the optimum, the demand, flexibility
activation and net import at each node n can be expressed
as linear functions of the nodal price at that node, given by
equations (17), (18), (19).
The total sum of the net imports at all nodes should
be negative or null, i.e.,
∑
n∈N Qn(ω) ≤ 0,∀ω ∈ Ω.
From the supply-demand balancing, this is equivalent to∑
n∈N (Dn(ω) − Gn(ω)) ≤
∑
n∈N ∆Gn(ω). A strict in-
equality would lead to a situation where a part of the energy
generation is wasted. That is not acceptable. To avoid that
situation, the RES-based generation should be limited and
the demand capacities large enough. Note that the sizing of
the prosumers capacities and RES-based generation possible
clipping strategies are out of the scope of this work. This
result is formalized in the proposition below.
Proposition 3: A necessary condition for no energy sur-
plus is that there is at least one prosumer n in N whose
capacities and RES-based generation are such that Dn(ω)−
Gn(ω) ≥ ∆Gn(ω).
Proof: Proof coincides with the proof of Proposition 2
of [11].
Substituting (16) in (19) and taking the sum over n, can
we derive that:
∑
n∈N
Qn ≤ 0⇔ λω0
∑
n
(
1
2pωa˜n
+
1
pωan
)
≥
≥
∑
n
((
D∗n −
1
2pωa˜n
(µωn − µωn) +
bn
an
+
1
pωan
(νωn − νωn)
)
−
−
(
1
2pωa˜n
+
1
pωan
)
(ξωn0−ξω0n+pω(b0n−bn0))−∆Gn
)
,
(20)
which gives a necessary and sufficient condition on λω0 to
avoid energy surplus.
2) Peer-to-Peer case: In the peer-to-peer setting, each
agent n ∈ N determines, by herself, her demand, energy
generation and bilateral trades with other agents in her local
energy community under constraints on demand, flexibility
activation and transmission capacity so as to minimize her
expected costs.
Formally, each agent in node n ∈ N solves the following
optimization problem:
min
Dn,Gn,qn
E[Πn], (21a)
s.t. (Dn, Gn, qn) ∈ Kn. (21b)
Remark 4: All the KKT conditions except (12) coincide
with centralized case. Under peer-to-peer market design,
equation (12) will be:
∂L
∂qmn
= 0⇔ pω
(
2amnqmn+amnqnm+bmn+p0(ω)
)
+
+ ξωnm + ζ
ω
nm − λωn = 0,∀ω ∈ Ω. (22)
From the last equation we infer that the nodal price at n can
be expressed analytically as:
λωn = pω
(
2amnqmn+amnqnm+bmn+p0(ω)
)
+ξωnm+ζ
ω
nm.
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From (22) following the same path as in centralized case
we obtain a closed form expression for the nodal price as a
function of λω0 :
λωn = λ
ω
0 + pωan0(q0n − qn0) + pω(b0n − bn0) + ξωn0 − ξω0n.
(23)
Remark 5: From the coincidence of KKT conditions with
centralized case, we infer that expressions for Dn, Gn, Qn
at the optimum coincide with (17), (18), (19) respectively.
However, note, that λωn appearing in these expressions differ
from the centralized case.
Remark 6: Note that expressions for λn in centralized
(16) and peer-to-peer (23) settings differ only by the term
pωan0(q0n − qn0). In the case a0n ≥ 0 the nodal price in
the peer-to-peer case is smaller than in the centralized ⇔
q0n < qn0 – node n ”exports” more energy to node 0, than
”imports” from it. Note, that if ”export” between node n and
node 0 equals ”import”, then (23) coincides with (16).
This situation may be viewed as a case of isolated com-
munity where there is no possibility to trade energy (q0n =
qn0 = 0) with the grid (e.g. islanded microgrid). In this
setting peer-to-peer framework coincides with centralized
market design.
B. Risk Averse Market Design
1) Centralized case: The centralized market design is
inspired from the existing pool-based markets. The global
Market Operator (MO) maximizes the social welfare defined
in (8) in the risk-averse agents framework:
min
D,G,q
R[SC],
s.t. (D,G, q) ∈ K. (24a)
For the case of our study we implement the cVaR as a
coherent risk measure. Denote χn as a risk attitude of the
prosumer n. The cVaR is the average of all realizations larger
than the VaR, where V aRn = minηn{ηn |P[Πωn ≤ ηn] =
χn}. With a little abuse of notations we denote V aRn as
ηn. Then, following [18], we write cVaR as follows:
R[Πn(ω)] = ηn +
1
(1− χn)
∑
ω∈Ω
pω[Πn(ω)− ηn]+. (25)
Note, that R[Πn(ω)] is convex in (Dn, Gn, qn, ηn) if Πn(ω)
is convex in (Dn, Gn, qn), which is the case in our model.
The non-differentiability of R[Πn(ω)] can be overcome by
leveraging the epigraph form of it as in [18]:
R[Πn(ω)] = ηn +
1
(1− χn)
∑
ω∈Ω
pωu
ω
n , (26)
with uωn ≥ 0 and Πn(ω)− ηn ≤ uωn with dual variables piωn
and τωn respectively. Define feasibility set K˜n as
K˜n(x−n) := {xn = (Dn, Gn, qn, un)|(Dn, Gn, qn)
∈ Kn(x−n), uωn ≥ 0,Πn(ω)− ηn ≤ uωn}, (27)
and again K˜ := ∏n K˜n(x−n). Then, risk-averse formulation
of the centralized market design takes the following form:
min
D,G,q,uω
∑
n∈N
(
ηn +
1
(1− χn)
∑
ω∈Ω
pωu
ω
n
)
, (28a)
s.t. (D,G, q,u) ∈ K˜. (28b)
Proposition 7: The reformulation (28) is equivalent to the
optimization problem (24).
Proof: Assume (D∗n, G
∗
n, (q
∗
n)n) is an optimum solu-
tion of (24). Denote S∗ as an optimal value of the problem
(24) and Π∗n(ω) - value of utility function of agent n in the
point (D∗n, G
∗
n, (q
∗
n)n). Consider the following problem:
min
uωn
∑
n∈N
(
ηn +
1
(1− χn)
∑
ω∈Ω
pωu
ω
n
)
, (29a)
s.t. uωn ≥ Π∗n(ω)− ηn, (29b)
uωn ≥ 0. (29c)
Denote S∗∗ as an optimal value of the above problem. It is
clear that for each fixed (D∗n, G
∗
n, (q
∗
n)n), S
∗ = S∗∗.
The objective function is convex as the sum of convex
functions defined on a convex feasibility set. Computations
of the first order stationarity conditions of the KKT give:
∂L
∂Dn(ω)
= 0⇔ 2τωn a˜n(Dn(ω)−D∗n)
− µω
n
+ µωn + λ
ω
n = 0, (30)
∂L
∂Gn(ω)
= 0⇔ τωn an(Gn(ω) + bn)− νωn
+ νωn − λωn = 0, (31)
∂L
∂qmn(ω)
= 0⇔ ζωnm+ξωnm+τωn (2amnqmn + amnqnm)
+ τωn (bmn + p0(ω)) + τ
ω
manmqnm − λωn = 0, (32)
∂L
∂uωn
= 0⇔ pω
1− χn − τ
ω
n − piωn = 0. (33)
Remark 8: It is easy to see that expressions for
Dn(ω), Gn(ω), Qn(ω) coincide with (17), (18), (19) with
two differences: first, instead of pω we have τωn , which is
expressed as:
τωn =
pω
1− χn − pi
ω
n . (34)
Second, expression for λ differs (because of τωn as well). τ
ω
n
could be viewed as a risk-adjusted probabilities [13] from
agent n’s point of view.
Note that there are two additional complementarity slack-
ness conditions (comparing to the risk neutral case) for
constraints uωn ≥ 0 and Πn(ω)− ηn ≤ uωn :
0 ≤ piωn ⊥ uωn ≥ 0, (35a)
0 ≤ τωn ⊥ uωn − (Πn(ω)− ηn) ≥ 0. (35b)
It follows that we can consider two complementary cases:
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1) Πn(ω)−ηn ≥ 0 – it means that uωn ≥ 0 and from (35a)
piωn = 0. It means that when loss function Πn(ω) of
agent n exceeds some threshold ηn defined through his
risk attitude χn, dual variable τωn is defined as:
τωn =
pω
1− χn . (36)
2) Πn(ω)−ηn < 0 – it means that uωn = 0 and from (35b)
τωn = 0. It means that when loss function Πn(ω) of
agent n is below ηn, dual variable piωn is defined as:
piωn =
pω
1− χn . (37)
2) Peer-to-Peer Case: In the peer-to-peer setting, each
agent n ∈ N determines, by herself, her demand, energy
generation and bilateral trades with other agents in her local
energy community under constraints on demand, flexibility
activation and transmission capacity so as to minimize her
costs. Agent n’s optimization problem takes the following
form:
min
Dn,Gn,qn
Rn[Πn], (38a)
s.t. (Dn, Gn, qn) ∈ Kn(x−n), (38b)
where qn =
(
qmn
)
m∈Γn are the trading decisions of pro-
sumer n.
Again implementing cVaR as a risk measure and leverag-
ing its epigraph form, we formulate agent n’s optimization
problem as:
min
Dn,Gn,qn,un
ηn +
1
(1− χn)
∑
ω∈Ω
pωu
ω
n , (39a)
s.t. (Dn, Gn, qn, un) ∈ K˜n(x−n). (39b)
Remark 9: Note that all the KKT conditions except (32)
coincide with the centralized case. In peer-to-peer setting,
(32) will be:
∂L
∂qmn(ω)
= 0⇔ ζωnm+ξωnm+τωn (2amnqmn + amnqnm)
+ τωn (bmn + p0(ω))− λωn = 0. (40)
V. EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEMS
We consider equilibrium problems in an incomplete mar-
ket.
A. Basic definitions
Since our problem is formulated with a scenario based
approach, the classical definitions of equilibrium (GNE, VE)
introduced in a deterministic setting are easily transposable
for each scenario.
Definition 10: Generalized Nash equilibrium [10] A Gen-
eralized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) of the game defined
by the minimization problems (21) (resp. (38)) with cou-
pling constraints, is a vector (Dn(ω), Gn(ω), q(ω)n)n that
solves the minimization problems (21) (resp. (38)) or,
equivalently, a vector (Dn(ω), Gn(ω), q(ω)n)n such that
(Dn(ω), Gn(ω), q(ω)n)n solves the system KKTn for each
n.
Definition 11: Variational equilibrium [10] A Varia-
tional Equilibrium (VE) of the game defined by the
minimization problems (21) (resp. (38)) with coupling
constraints, is a vector (Dn(ω), Gn(ω), q(ω)n)n that
solves the minimization problems (21) (resp. (38)) or,
equivalently, a vector (Dn(ω), Gn(ω), q(ω)n)n such that
(Dn(ω), Gn(ω), q(ω)n)n solves the system KKTn for each
n and, in addition, such that the Lagrangian multipliers
associated to the coupling constraints (1) are equal, i.e.:
ζωnm = ζ
ω
mn. (41)
The term “variational” refers to the variational inequality
problem associated to such an equilibrium: xˆ ∈ K is a
Variational Equilibrium if, and only if, it is a solution of:
〈∇Πn(xˆ),x− xˆ〉 ≤ 0,∀x ∈ K. (42)
B. Results
We can observe, that in risk averse case in the setting of
Example 1, Variational Equilibria are defined by exactly the
same KKTs system than the social cost minimizer, which
leads to the following result:
Proposition 12: Assuming amn = anm = 0,∀m,n ∈
N ,m 6= n, in the risk averse case the set of Variational
Equilibria (such that ζωnm = ζ
ω
mn for all n ∈ N and all
m 6= n ∈ Γn) coincides with the set of social cost optima.
Remark 13: For risk-neutral case with the general formu-
lation of the trading cost C˜n(qn) it doesn’t hold as is shown
in Remark 4.
Proposition 14: Risk-neutral peer-to-peer market design
problem admits a unique Variational Equilibrium.
Proof: Note, that in the setting of risk-neutral case,
utility function of player n can be viewed as the sum of two
terms:
• Cn(Gn(ω))+p0(ω)Qn(ω)−Un(Dn(ω)) – user-specific
part of utility function, which depends only on the
variables of player n only and not on the variables of
other player. Note, that it is strongly convex twice con-
tinuously differentiable function as the sum of strongly
convex and convex functions of xn = (Dn, Gn, qn).
• C˜n(qn(ω)) – trading cost of agent n, modeled as a
function of trading decisions of agents on the edge
(n,m). Note, that trading decisions qmn of agent n
could be viewed as a decision of agent n on the link
(m,n) - that is, let L denote the set of all edges of
the network. Then, without loss of generality and a
small abuse of notation, we denote function qnl , l =
(m,n),∀n,m ∈ N as follows:
qnl =
{
qmn, m ∈ Γn,
0, otherwise.
Then, cnm(q) - link-specific cost - can be rewritten for link
l ∈ L as:
cnm(q) = cl(q) = al
∑
n∈N
qnl + bl.
Note that (cl)′i = (cl)
′
j > 0, i 6= j and (cl)′′ij = 0. To
conclude, note, that strategy sets of each user are closed
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and convex. Then, from Proposition 1 in [23], it follows that
peer-to-peer problem admits unique VE.
VI. COMPLETENESS OF THE MARKET
To complete the market in the sense of definition given
in [4], [13] - that is - a market is said to be complete
whenever there exists an equilibrium price for every asset in
every possible state of the world. The market is incomplete
otherwise., we include financial contracts that are intended
to hedge the risk for market participants [7,13]. We assume
that the agents can trade risk with each other using these
contracts, i.e., they pay a certain amount contingent on a
given scenario occurring. Note, that risk trading layer differs
from energy trading layer (e.g. it doesn’t depend on physical
properties) - in this section we assume that agent n can trade
risk with the whole community N . The price for the contract
corresponding to the scenario ω is denoted αω . We also
assume existence of the exogenous agent (e.g. aggregator,
insurance company etc.) which back up shortfall of the risk
traded with fixed prices γω per scenario ω. We impose that
for each ω ∈ Ω, αω ≤ 1, γω ≤ 1 so it is beneficial to buy
contract corresponding to the scenario ω.
Trading risk involves prosumers making a first-stage de-
cision which consists in agent n paying
∑
ω∈Ω α
ωWωn +∑
ω∈Ω γ
ωJωn to obtain contingent payments W
ω
n +J
ω
n in each
outcome ω ∈ Ω. Here we assume that Wωn are the contracts
traded inside the community and Jωn are the contracts traded
with an exogenous agent. Note that Wωn could be negative,
while Jωn ≥ 0.
Then, objective function Rn[Πn] of prosumer n in risk-
averse case is expressed as follows:
Rn[Πn(ω)] = ηn +
∑
ω∈Ω
αωWωn +
∑
ω∈Ω
γωJωn
+
1
(1− χn)
∑
ω∈Ω
pω[Πn(ω)− (Wωn + Jωn )− ηn]+. (43)
We add risk trading balance per scenario condition:∑
n∈N
(Wωn + J
ω
n ) = 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω, (44)
with dual variable φω associated to it. Define feasibility set
Kˆ as:
Kˆn(x−n) := {xn = (Dn, Gn, qn, un,Wn, Jn)|(Dn, Gn,
qn, un) ∈ K˜n(x−n), (44) and 0 ≤ Jωn hold ∀ω ∈ Ω},
(45)
and Kˆ := ∏n Kˆn(x−n).
A. Centralized case
Thus, we formulate risk-averse formulation with risk trad-
ing using auxiliary variables uωn as:
min
D,G,q,uω,Wω,Jω
∑
n∈N
Rn[Πn(ω)], (46a)
s.t. (D,G, q,u,W ,J) ∈ Kˆ. (46b)
Comparing to the model without financial contracts, there
will be two additional first order stationarity conditions:
∂L
∂Wωn
= 0⇔ αω − τωn + φω = 0, (47a)
∂L
∂Jωn
= 0⇔ γω − τωn + φω − σωn = 0. (47b)
Theorem 15: Price αω of the contracts inside the com-
munity is not bigger than the exogenous price γω . More
precisely, there are three regimes of the market:
(1) When exogenous company settles trading price γω ≤
minn∈N pω1−χn , price α
ω for trading contracts inside the
community is defined as follows:
(1.a) When there is at least one agent trading risk with
the exogenous agent, αω = γω .
(1.b) When the risk is fully traded inside the community
(Jωn = 0, ∀n ∈ N ), αω = −φω ≤ γω , where φω is dual
variable for risk balance condition.
(2) When exogenous price is γω ≥ maxn pω1−χn , there are
three possible regimes for price αω:
(2.a) αω = −φω , where φω is a dual variable for risk
balance condition.
(2.b) αω = τω−φω , where τωn are aligned across agents.
(2.c) αω = pω1−minn χn – price of the contracts for risk
trading inside the community is equal to the least risk-
averse prosumer’s risk adjusted probability.
(3) When minn pω1−χn < γ
ω < maxn
pω
1−χn , contracts inside
the community are settled as follow:
(3.a) If there is at least one agent n′ with pω1−χn′ < γ
ω
and Π(ω)n′ − ηn′ > 0, then αω = γω .
(3.b) Otherwise, price αω is settled as in the case (2).
Proof: From (47a) and (47b) we infer that αω = γω −
σωn . Note that from complementarity condition for constraint
Jωn ≥ 0 we get σωn ≥ 0 which shows αω ≤ γω . Also, note
that in equation σωn = γ
ω−αω , right part doesn’t depend on
n, which means that σωn = σ
ω
m, ∀m,n ∈ N .
(1.a) If at least one agent n′ trades risk with exogenous
agent, that is Jωn′ > 0, then from complementarity
conditions, σωn = σ
ω
n′ = 0, ∀n ∈ N . It follows directly,
that αω = γω .
(1.b) If ∀n ∈ N , Jωn = 0, then σωn ≥ 0. From (47b) we
get
σω = γω + φω − τωn , (48)
where we omit index n in σωn for convenience. Note,
that it means that τωn are aligned across agents. We
state that Πn(ω) −Wωn − ηn ≤ 0, ∀n, and thus from
complementarity condition, τωn = 0,∀n ∈ N . Indeed,
from the contradiction: if there was an agent n′ with
τωn′ 6= 0, that is Πn′(ω) − Wωn′ − ηn′ > 0, then she
would buy contract Jωn′ for the price γ
ωJωn′ , which is
less than the gain from buying this contract: pω1−χn′ J
ω
n′
and have a guaranteed decrease in cost function, which
contradicts assumption Jωn = 0,∀n ∈ N .
(2) Note that when γω ≥ maxn pω1−χn , it is non-profitable
for any prosumer in the community to trade risk with the
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exogenous agent, which means that Jωn = 0, ∀n ∈ N .
Similarly to the case (1.b) we get σω = γω + φω − τωn
and τωn = τ
ω
m, ∀n,m,∈ N .
(2.a) This price corresponds to the case when supply of
the risk to trade inside the community exceeds the demand,
that is, Πn(ω)−Wωn − ηn ≤ 0, ∀n. Similarly to (1.b), from
complementarity conditions, τωn = 0, ∀n, and it follows that
αω = −φω .
(2.b) Assume that in the equilibrium, Πn(ω)−Wωn −ηn ≥
0,∀n ∈ N and there exists at least one prosumer with
Πn′(ω) − Wωn′ − ηn′ > 0 – that is piωn′ = 0 for some
n′ ∈ N . Denote M ⊆ N - set of such agents. We get that
if n1, n2 ∈ M, then χn1 = χn2 and if n1 ∈ M, n2 6∈ M,
then
piωn2 = pω
χn2 − χn1
(1− χn2)(1− χn1)
. (49)
Note that from complementarity condition piωn ≥ 0. It follows
that χn2 ≥ χn1 , so, if n1 ∈ M then χn1 = minn χn. If
M = N , then Πn(ω) −Wωn − ηn > 0, ∀n - it means that
piωn = 0, ∀n ∈ N . It follows that pω1−χn1 =
pω
1−χn2 ,∀n1, n2 ∈N , so we are in homogeneous risk aversion case.
(2.c) This regime corresponds to the case when Πn(ω)−
Wωn − ηn = 0, ∀n ∈ N . Define B ⊂ N (S ⊂ N ) - set
of players who buy (sell) contracts in the optimum, that is
- Π(ω)n − ηn > 0 (Π(ω)n − ηn < 0 ). Assume that αω 6=
pω
1−minn χn , then:
• If prosumer n′ is in B, where n′ := argminn 11−χn , it
would be unprofitable for her to buy contracts Wωn′ ,
which contradicts with the assumption Πn(ω)−Wωn −
ηn = 0, ∀n ∈ N .
• If n′ 6∈ S⋃B, which means that Π(ω)n′ = ηn′ , then
she could start selling contracts to decrease her cost
R[Π(ω)n′ ], thus leading to a contradiction.
• Similarly, the same contradiction arises in n′ ∈ S, when
|S| ≥ 2.
(3.a) If there exists an agent n′ with pω1−χn′ < γ
ω and
Πn′(ω) − ηn′ > 0, then it would be profitable for her to
buy contract from exogenous agent - that is, Jωn′ > 0. Then,
proof coincides with the case (1.a).
(3.b) Indeed, if there is no such agent, it means that Jωn =
0, ∀n ∈ N , which leads to the same framework as in (2).
Corollary 16: As a follow up of Proposition 15, in a
complete market, the risk adjusted probabilities of the agents
are aligned, i.e., τωn = τ
ω
n′ ,∀n, n′ ∈ N .
B. Decentralized case
Decentralized setting for risk trading in the peer-to-peer
framework is rarely considered in the literature for energy
trading. Risk-averse formulation with risk trading contracts
and auxiliary variables uωn takes the following form:
min
D,G,q,uω,Wω,Jω
Rn[Πn(ω)], (50a)
s.t. (Dn, Gn, qn, un,Wn, Jn) ∈ Kˆn(x−n).
(50b)
Remark 17: Using the notion of Generalized Potential
Games (GPG), as defined in [5], we can show that (50) is a
GPG. Indeed, the objective functions in (50) do not depend
on the other players variables, so that the interaction of the
players takes places only at the level of feasible sets. Thus,
the potential function is given by the sum of the objective
functions of all players, that is P =
∑
n∈N Rn[Πn]. This
means that (50) can be reformulated as an equivalent opti-
mization problem, with P in the objective [5]. Due to com-
putational and communication limitations, it is not always
possible to solve a large-scale optimization problem, and it is
preferable to decompose the problem so that it can be solved
by a distributed algorithmic approach. To that purpose,
we can implement Regularized Gauss-Seidel best-response
algorithm for the problem (50) which is proven to converge
for GPG in [5]. Recent research has focused on distributed
algorithms for computing GNEs, so that coordination and
information sharing within the agents are limited. Specific
results exist for aggregative games [15]. Recently, it has been
proven that distributed learning approaches might also be
relevant for games with strictly convex potential functions
[20]. Since none of these settings straightforwardly apply to
our problem, we foresee it as future research direction for
our work.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Three node case
In this section, we first present a toy network with only
three nodes indexed by {0, 1, 2}. As in Proposition 12 we
assume that amn = anm = 0, ∀m,n ∈ N . The root node
0 has only conventional generation ∆G0 = 0, with cost
(a0, b0) = (4, 30) and (Gn, Gn) = (0, 10) for n ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
∆Gn > 0 for n ∈ {1, 2}. Each node is a consumer with
(D,D) = (0, 10) and generator (RES or conventional),
therefore producing energy that can be consumed locally to
meet demand Dn and exported to the other nodes to meet
the unsatisfied demand.
Regarding the preferences (anm)nm, nodes 1 and 2 both
prefer to buy local and to RES-based generators. Node 0
is assumed to be indifferent between buying energy from
node 1 or node 2. Capacities are also defined larger from
the source node 0 (κ0n = 10) than between the prosumers
nodes (κnm = 5).
In Table I we depict difference in values of the cost
function in different frameworks of the market : risk-
neutral (RN); risk averse homogeneous in agents’ risk at-
titudes (RA): (χ0, χ1, χ2) = (0.3, 0.3, 0.3); risk averse with
one agent deviating (RA with dev.) in her risk attitude:
(χ0, χ1, χ2) = (0.3, 0.9, 0.3); risk-heterogeneous (RH) with
(χ0, χ1, χ2) = (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) and risk-heterogeneous with
(χ0, χ1, χ2) = (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) and risk-hedging contracts
(RH with contr.).
As it is depicted in Table I, introduction of risk attitudes
affects market in a negative way, decreasing the profit of
the community. Changes in risk attitudes do not affect the
profit of node 0 neither in risk-heterogeneous case, neither
in the case of one node deviation. Deviation of node 1 from
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TABLE I
AGENTS’ EXPECTED COSTS FOR DIFFERENT RISK SETTINGS.
Node RN RA RA dev. RH RH contr.
0 -6.1191 -10.0359 -10.0359 -10.0359 -14.0763
1 -22.3625 -13.3460 -13.3311 -13.3437 -9.8183
2 -7.2290 -7.1371 -7.1445 -7.1044 -6.6550
SC -35.7107 -30.5191 -30.5116 -30.4842 -30.5497
TABLE II
FINCANCIAL CONTRACTS TRADING.
Node W
Scenarios p0 p1 p2
0 -9.53446 -9.4188 -9.44783
1 8.24404 8.35619 8.38462
2 1.29042 1.06261 1.06321
αω 0.47618 0.47618 0.47618
τω 0.47618 0.0476 0.47618
φω 0.0 -0.42855 0.0
χ1 = 0.3 to χ1 = 0.9 in RA with dev. causes small decrease
in her utility, but increased utility of node 2, leading to
the small decrease of utility of the whole community. Risk-
heterogeneity decreases the profit of node 2 with highest risk
attitude χ2 = 0.5 and leads to a small decrease of community
expected social cost.
Introduction of contracts leads to the biggest increase of
the community’s utility comparing to the simple RH or RA
cases as it allows node 0 to sell “surplus of utility” to node
1 and to a smaller extent to node 2. As it is very costly
for node 0 to produce energy, it is more profitable for it to
hedge risk of other nodes, when the price αω = pω1−minn χn
and γ = pω1−maxn χn . Both node 1 and node 2 benefit from
buiyng contracts from node 0 as the price α is set to be
profitable for both.
Note that τω = pω1−minn χn for ω ∈ {1, 2} and it corre-
sponds to regime 2.b described in Proposition 15: indeed,
for node 0 (χ0 = minn χn) dual variables pi00 = pi
2
0 equal 0,
which means that node 0 ∈M.
Fig. 1. Risk averse (SC = −16.99)
0
1 2
Πω00 = −3.41
D0 = 3.72
G0 = 0
Q0 = 3.72
Πω01 = −10.15
D1 = 2.14
Q1 = −0.92
Πω02 = −3.42
D2 = 2.03
Q2 = −2.80
q
02
=
2.19
ζ
02 =
3.30
q 1
0
=
5.
92
ζ 1
0
=
3.
30
q21 = 5.0
ζ21 =3.46
In Table III we consider three node network in which now
nodes 1 and 2 are prosumers with RES-based generators:
(G1, G1) = (G2, G2) = (0, 0) for n ∈ {1, 2}.
Fig. 2. RA with contracts (SC = −16.99)
0
1 2
Πω00 = −6.52
W0 = −7.97
Πω01 = −9.62
W1 = 1.34
Πω02 = −0.84
W2 = 6.62
q
02
=
2.19
ris
k
he
dg
in
g
q 1
0
=
5.
92
risk
hedging
q21 = 5.0
TABLE III
NODE 1 AND 2 ONLY RES-BASED PRODUCTION.
Node RN RA RH RA dev. RH contr.
0 -3.55 -3.4207 -3.4145 -3.4201 -6.5273
1 -10.18 -10.1514 -10.1545 -10.1522 -9.6289
2 -3.52 -3.4258 -3.4210 -3.4255 -0.8417
SC -17.25 -16.9980 -16.9901 -16.9979 -16.9980
We can observe, that now node 0 becomes more sensitive
to the changes of node 1 and node 2 risk attitudes: both devi-
ation of node 1 (RA with dev.: (χ0, χ1, χ2) = (0.3, 0.9, 0.3))
and risk heterogeneity ((χ0, χ1, χ2) = (0.3, 0.4, 0.5)) have
higher impact comparing to Table I.
As illustrated in the table, the introduction of contracts
changes the behavior of prosumers as now again with price
αω set to be pω1−minn χn it is more profitable for node 0 to sell
risk-hedging contracts. On the other side, nodes 1 and 2 tend
to hedge their risk coming from RES-based generation for
cheap price (from their perception of risk). Also, we may
note, that introduction of contracts put SC of RH case to
be equal to RA case where agents have equal risk attitude
parameters χn. Figure 1 illustrates the network for the setting
(for one scenario ω = ω0) described in Table III: node 1 and
node 2 have only RES-based generation. Note that the trade
from node 1 to node 2 is done at full capacity.
In Figure 2, we show the same network (for one scenario
ω = ω0), but with contracts included in the agents’ opti-
mization problems. Note that we have a similar situation as
the one depicted in Table II: again, it is more profitable for
node 1 to sell risk-hedging contracts than to produce energy
due to the high conventional generation costs.
B. 14-bus network
In this example, we consider the IEEE 14-bus network
system as in [11]. Each pair of busses is able to trade with her
neighboring busses, up to the capacity of the edge linking the
pair of busses. We consider two cases: (1) cnm = cmn = 1
and (2) cnm
are taken as in [11] - bnm are chosen uniformly in [0, 1]
if n 6= 1,m 6= 1, and with assumption that agents have
a preference for local trades so the price with the grid
connection bus cn1 chosen uniformly in [1, 2]. The grid
connection bus has no preferences so that c1n = 1 for each
n neighboring bus 1.
9
Fig. 3. Uniform prices Fig. 4. Heterogeneous prices
As depicted on the Figures 3 and 4, increasing of hetero-
geneity in risk attitudes of the agents leads to more active
trading of financial contracts. Heterogeneity in the trading
costs puts financial restrictions on energy trading, that lead
to activation of risk-hedging on the lower values of Gini
index. As in the case of three nodes, node 0 actively sells
contracts, as it is more profitable for her to sell contracts
than to produce energy.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We formulate two market design (centralized used as
benchmark, and peer-to-peer) under risk neutral and risk
averse settings. We analyse the market equilibria for these
two settings and characterize the impact of strategic behav-
iors of the agents and risk attitude heterogeneity on the mar-
ket equilibria, relying on Generalized Nash Equilibrium and
Variational Equilibrium as solution concepts. We consider
the inclusion of risk hedging mechanisms in the incomplete
energy trading market, in the form of financial contracts, and
provide closed form characterizations of the risk-adjusted
probabilities under different market regimes.
As next step, we will focus on the development of dis-
tributed learning algorithms for risk trading mechanism, that
minimize the information exchanges among the prosumers.
Some results already exist for aggregative games or under
strict convexity of the potential function, which do not hold
here. Another research direction would be to consider the
strategic behavior of an aggregator located at the root node.
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